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Abstract—The paper depicts a complex, distributed information 
system aimed at promoting cybersecurity awareness at the national 
level. The system, that is built in accordance with the Act on 
National Cybersecurity, passed by the Polish Parliament, enables 
collecting and processing in near-real time available information 
on the security status of essential services and digital services and, 
also, provides for assessment of negative impact of the identified 
threats concerned with the provision of those services. Advanced 
access control and dissemination mechanisms, for secure 
information sharing within the system, are provided in order to 
aggregate distributed knowledge and use this information for on-
line security risk analysis and for generation and distribution  of 
early warnings. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
E currently observe an increasing number of more and 
more sophisticated, and growing in complexity, cyber-
attacks. They pose serious threats to functioning the network 
and information systems, especially those being important from 
the point of view of reliable and secure business and social 
activities. They can lead to violation of continuous provision 
and/or to deterioration of the quality of essential and digital 
services. This, in consequence, may bring significant damage to 
state, in particular to state security, public and economic order, 
functioning of public institutions, civil rights and freedoms, and, 
finally, to human life and health. 
The situation is complicated by strong interdependence of the 
services, presented for instance in [1-4], as well as by the shared 
use of ICT resources; both significantly extend the area of 
impact of existing threats and create new channels for attacks. 
This means that effective identification of threats in cyberspace, 
an assessment of their impact on the services rendered or tasks 
performed, and response to actual demand are not possible 
without the cooperation of teams responsible for IT security 
analysis and management [5]. Obtaining a reliable situational 
picture of the cyberspace and ensuring a high level of protection 
against threats at the national level requires development of the 
procedures enabling exchange of experience and effective 
cooperation of all entities being responsible for ICT security. It 
is also necessary to create technical solutions enabling effective 
acquisition, processing, and distribution of the verified 
information on the existing threats and their potential effects. 
Recently, much research effort and case studies have been 
undertaken with an objective to develop methods and technical 
skills and solutions enabling the effective sharing of information 
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on threats and their potential detrimental effects. For example, 
the CS-AWARE project (https://cs-aware.eu/), launched under 
the H2020 Program, focuses on creating solutions dedicated to 
local public administration bodies, non-governmental 
organizations, and small and medium-sized enterprises. The 
developed tools enable for automatic detection, classification, 
and visualization of computer incidents in near-real time, 
supporting the prevention or mitigation of the effects of such 
events. The solutions, created within this project, are based on 
mechanisms for information sharing, concerning actual threats 
and on using the advanced methods of big data analysis and 
processing. 
A number of new solutions, focused on increasing awareness 
to cyber threats and improving the level of security of networks 
and information systems, are also available. For example, an 
interesting approach for building a common cybersecurity 
awareness of critical infrastructure is presented in [6]. By 
aggregating and analysing the data, obtained from security 
management systems and their correlation, a global 
cybersecurity picture is created that also allows – due to the 
links between critical infrastructure elements – for anticipating 
the risks of threat propagation. An interesting proposal of 
information system for collaborative cyber incident 
management for the European interconnected critical 
infrastructure is presented in [7]. 
The actions, taken in Poland, aimed at providing legal, 
organizational and technical foundations for obtaining a high 
level of protection against computer threats, also fall under this 
trend. They were and are being stimulated by the Directive of 
the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 
[8] of the 6th July 2016 on the measures for a high level of 
security of network and information systems on the territory of 
the Union, colloquially referred as the NIS Directive. This 
Directive imposed, on the member states, an obligation to 
implement several regulations, related, for instance, to: 
• development and adoption of the strategies for security of 
networks and information systems at the national level,  
• establishing requirements and procedures for reporting 
cybersecurity incidents by essential service providers and 
main core operators of digital services, 
•  creating a network of national Computer Security Incident 
Response Teams (CSIRTs). 
Several initiatives have been undertaken by EU and at a state 
level of EU states to implement the NIS Directive. In 2017, in 
particular, ETSI launched the document [9] that provides 
guidance on the available and being developed technical 
specifications designed to meet the legal measures and 
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requirements regarding sharing the information on the network-
based risks and incidents. An overview of the state-of-the-art of 
the implementation on NIS Directive within Europe is available 
at (https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/state-play-
transposition-nis-directive). 
On the 5th July 2018, the Polish Parliament passed the Bill 
on the National Cybersecurity System (NCS), which specifies 
the frame of the organization of this system, the tasks and 
responsibilities of all entities involved in this system, the 
manner of exercising supervision and control on application of 
the Act, as well as determines the scope of the Cybersecurity 
Strategy of the Republic of Poland. The Act is also accompanied 
by several implementing provisions, which define specific 
requirements concerning sectors of economy and important 
individual institutions. 
The regulations are aimed at creating both efficient and 
secure system that should increase the level of protection against 
computer threats in Poland and they enable effective 
cooperation with the EU Member States. The system includes 
essential service operators, digital service providers, and the 
public entities (i.e. institutions that perform public tasks or 
dispose of public property). It is to be managed at the 
operational level by three Computer Security Incident Response 
Teams (CSIRT GOV, CSIRT MON, CSIRT NASK), and – at 
the central level – by the Governmental Representative for 
Cybersecurity and the Board for Cybersecurity.  
The Act imposes a number of obligations on NCS 
components and entities. In particular, essential service 
operators are required to implement security management tools 
within their information systems enabling the provision of the 
services concerned. Also, they have an obligation to: 
• exercise permanent risk analysis and incident management, 
• implement technical and organizational measures as 
appropriate and proportionate to the estimated risks, 
• gather information on cyber threats and vulnerabilities of 
the information system supporting provision of a given 
service, 
• report serious incidents to the appropriate CSIRT no later 
than 24 hours from its detection, 
• use appropriate measures to prevent and limit the 
detrimental impact of the detected cyber incidents on the 
rendered services, including removal of the identified 
vulnerabilities. 
The CSIRT teams are required to ensure coherent and 
complete risk management system at the national level and to 
implement the measures to mitigate cyber threats of cross-
sectoral and cross-border nature, as well as to coordinate the 
handling of reported incidents. Each CSIRT has a clearly 
defined scope of responsibility and a set of supervised entities. 
The tasks of the CSIRTs include, among others: 
• monitoring cyber threats and incidents at the national 
level, 
• estimation of risks, related to the disclosed cyber threats, 
and the occurring incidents, including a dynamic risk 
analysis, 
• providing information on incidents and risks to the entities 
of the NCS, 
• responding to the reported incidents and issuing messages 
informing about the identified cyber threats, 
• classification of incidents and coordination of their 
handling. 
The Act on NCS also imposes on the cabinet minister 
responsible for developing and maintaining an ICT system 
being able to:  
• support the cooperation of all the national cybersecurity 
system entities,  
• report and handle incidents,  
• perform risk analysis at the national level, and disseminate 
warnings relevant to the considered entities.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
presents architectural and functional features of the National 
Platform for Cybersecurity (NPC) – an ICT system enabling 
collecting and processing of the current available information 
on a security status of essential and digital services. NPC is 
designed to assess the possible detrimental impacts of the 
identified threats on the services. Some solutions, supporting 
secure information sharing and risk analysis at the national 
level, are presented in Section III. Section IV describes the 
concept of NPC system implementation in the operational 
environment. In the conclusion section, possible limitations 
related to promoting and achieving the cybersecurity awareness 
at the national level are discussed. 
II.  NATIONAL PLATFORM FOR CYBERSECURITY 
An important component of the ICT system, that meets the 
requirements of the Act on NCS, is the research project entitled 
"National Platform for Cybersecurity" (NPC) carried out within 
the framework of the CybeSecIdent Program on "Cybersecurity 
and e-Identity", supported by the National Centre for Research 
and Development. The main goal of the project is to develop a 
prototype of a comprehensive, integrated system for continuous 
monitoring, detection, depicting the threats and risks and 
disseminating the warnings that concern the threats actually 
affecting or likely to affect in the near future, both the quality 
and continuity of essential and digital services and the tasks 
performed by public entities, in particular those services and 
tasks, the deterioration of which may cause significant damage 
to security, public order, international relations, and to broadly 
understood economic interests. 
To achieve this goal, it was necessary to create the 
mechanisms for integration of the security management systems 
used by various institutions and companies, and an aggregation 
of a distributed knowledge from numerous databases. In 
addition, it was necessary to develop procedural and technical 
solutions to ensure secure sharing and dissemination of the 
information about events that could adversely affect the 
cybersecurity. 
The NPC ecosystem, shown in Figure 1, includes essential 
services operators (ESO), digital service providers (DSP), 
Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT), other 
NCS entities, NPC Backbone Network and external sources of 
threat data. The external sources of threat data, available to the 
NPC entities, are collected and verified at the CSIRT level, 
which provides integrated and updated online threat database 
for the service providers. 
A partnership cooperation model of the NCS entities was 
adopted. This means that the service providers are free to make 
decisions on joining the Platform and complying with mutually 
accepted principles of cooperation, especially in terms of 
protection the shared data. 
 





Fig.1. NPC ecosystem  
 
The Platform supports secure exchange of several types of 
data between CSIRT and the Security Operation Centers (SOC) 
of the service providers, like for instance: 
• information on the rendered services and the conditions for 
their provisioning (including, but not limited to service 
interdependencies) and the possible consequences related 
to disruptions of service continuity and/or quality), 
• information on the identified security incidents together 
with the incident descriptions and possible consequences 
(i.e. impact on the rendered services), 
• information on the identified vulnerabilities along with 
their potential impact on the exploitation of those 
vulnerabilities on the security of the rendered services, 
• reports on newly discovered vulnerabilities and the 
indicators of compromise (IoC), 
• information on security breaching events, 
• reports concerning suspicious data and raw data requiring 
detailed analysis, 
• results of technical analyses related to cybersecurity, 
• recommendations and conclusions resulting from 
performed analyses, 
• possible hazard warnings, 
• results of risk analysis in relation to rendered services, 
• recommendations regarding the desired actions to mitigate 
the effects of incidents and possible threats. 
The National Platform for Cybersecurity, as shown in Figure 
2, consists of four functional system component types, i.e.: 
Operations Centre System (OCS), Edge System (ES), 
Management System (MS), and Backbone Network (BN).  





Fig.2. NPC systems  
 
It is a central place for exchange of the cybersecurity 
information. It integrates the data about threads obtained from 
external sources, collects information from the ESs, relevant to 
the security and continuity of rendered essential and digital 
services, and it provides its own information resources 
necessary for quick and effective response to existing or 
potential threats. The OCS is a part of the CSIRT system 
preforming an outstanding role in execution of several essential 
processes that include: 
• provision of information on the present status of 
cybersecurity concerning essential and digital services, 
both at the local and national level, 
• management of incident reporting, 
• aggregation of vulnerability data available from the external 
sources and sharing the integrated vulnerability database 
with the NPC customers1, 
 
 
1Customer is an entity that provides essential and/or digital services and 
participates in exchanging the cybersecurity data over the Edge System 
• modelling of the service interdependencies and threats 
propagation,  
• security risk analysis at the national level, 
• exchange of knowledge supporting technical analysis of 
threats, 
• dissemination of security warnings. 
To ensure reliable operation, the OCS is deployed in broadly 
available configuration (Dual Modular Redundancy). The Edge 
System is a customer portal enabling access to the Platform 
resources. It provides a graphical user interface (GUI) and 
application programming interface (API) for integration with 
security management systems used by the customer. The system 
also performs the tasks related to monitoring and recording the 
customer activity and ensures accountability and non-
repudiation of the exchanged information. 
Application gateways perform the functions related to secure 




with the adopted security policy. The Backbone Network 
connects the NPC system components using encrypted virtual 
tunnels (VPN) created in the existing telecommunications 
networks. The Management System performs the tasks related 
to management of the certificates, system devices, system 
components, and application configurations, as well as of 
monitoring the security status of all NPC systems. 
III. SELECTED SOLUTIONS 
A. Assessment of the services’ interdependencies 
A necessary condition for safe and reliable provision of an 
essential or a digital service is to ensure a high level of 
protection of the network and information systems upon which 
its operation is conditioned. However, due to existing 
dependencies and interdependencies of the services, a 
malfunction of a single service may cause cascading, negative 
impact on other services provision, as it was discussed for 
instance in [10,11,12,13].  
For this reason, an important part of NPC is a mechanism 
supporting identification and assessment of impact of potential 
threats that can lead to violation of continuity and deterioration 
of the quality of essential and digital services due to their 
complexity and interrelation. It supports: 
• creation of the network of services rendered by different 
providers and the services’ interdependencies, 
• dissemination of the information on incidents that could 
violate the stability and security of the services,  
• dynamic risk assessment of the services and modelling risk 
propagation in the cybersphere, 
• selection of specific security recommendations and their 
distribution to service providers to improve safety of 
rendering the services. 
A network of the services’ interdependencies is obtained by 
conducting surveys, in which service operators answer a number 
of questions. The survey collects the information in three 
sections: 
• a set of data that uniquely identifies the operator, 
• description of attributes of each essential/digital service 
being reported, 
• description of the supporting services. 
The network of interdependent services is presented in the 
form of weighted graph, where the vertices (V) represent 
services and the edges (E) reflect the dependency of the 
services. The edge Ei  is described by the vector: 
 
 𝐸𝑖 = (𝑉𝑚 , 𝑉𝑛 , 𝑲
(𝑚,𝑛)) (1) 
 
where 𝑲(𝑚,𝑛) is the matrix of criticalities describing impact of 
Vn on Vm regarding the aspects of availability (a), integrity (i), 
and confidentiality (c), i.e.: 
 





















The graph structure and the criticality matrices determine the 
importance of services, i.e., the impact on safe and reliable 
operation of other services. This impact can be expressed in 
terms of scope and intensity that a given service malfunction has 
or may have on the other services. Taking into account (1) and 
(2), the importance of service Vm may be expressed by security 
triad, i.e.: availability, integrity, and confidentiality: 
 









A number of metrics are discussed in the literature, for 
instance in [14], to express the criticality of a service impact. 
For the purpose of this work, the recursive maximum 
availability degree was adopted, which is based on the highest 









}) , 𝑛 ∈ ℰ(0ut;1) (𝑉𝑚)  (4) 
A detailed presentation of the mechanism and description of 
procedures used for identification and security management of 
the services are presented in [15]. A comparative study on 
sensitivity of various centrality indexes to measure each service 
vulnerability, combined with various aggregation methods to 
errors in edge weights, reported by service operators presented 
in [14] confirmed the value of the proposed formulas. 
B. Application gateway 
The application gateways create closed and centrally configured 
set of devices that perform basic functions ensuring the secure 
sharing of resources between NPC entities, i.e.:  
• data transfer in accordance with the distribution rules, 
• hiding information about the sender and recipient of the 
message, 
• anonymous acknowledgment of the receipt of a message, 
• anonymization of the sensitive data, 
•  message encryption. 
The NPC security policy assumes that an individual customer 
cannot know the names and physical addresses of the other 
customers. The full list of NPC customers and configuration 
data of the Backbone Network is known only to the NPC 
management system. Only the identity of the OCS is known, by 
default, to all NPC customers.  
All messages from any customer system are forwarded to the 
OCS. If a given message should be sent to some other 
customers, it is addressed using a symbolic name of that group 
corresponding to a defined number of proper names. The 
symbolic name may correspond, for example, to industry sector 
or community to which a customer belongs. The full list of NPC 
customers, grouped under the symbolic names, is known to the 
NPC management system only. 
Camouflage of the message sender relies on changing the 
value of the selected fields in its header to the constant value 
"anonymous". The sender's anonymization is not carried out in 
case of the message exchange with OCS. The recipient's 
concealment procedure is also used for anonymous 
acknowledgment of the messages receipt. A full 
acknowledgement is made by the OCS only.  
If a customer message contains the sensitive data, the broad 
disclosure of which may threaten the security or reputation of 
this customer, then these data are anonymized. The data are 
marked by the sender in a specific way, which makes the 
application gateway to replace them by a string of characters 
“xxx” of the same length as the original text whenever this 
message is sent to the other customer. Anonymization is not 
performed for the messages transferred to OCS. 
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The application gateways are authenticated with the X.509 
certificate. Certificates are generated for each functional system 
and signed with the CA root certificate of the NPC. Each of 
them contains the name of the functional system, its public key, 
and the certificate's validity period. The message sent by the 
application gateway is accompanied by the signature of the 
sending system.  
Messages, shared within the NPC, are encrypted both at the 
network and the application layers of OSI model. Standard 
IPSec protocol is used for securing VPN connections between 
the NPC entities. In addition, the elliptic curves cryptography is 
used at the application layer for encryption of the data 
transferred between NPC system components. 
C. Risk analysis at the national level 
Obtaining awareness of cyber security, both at the level of the 
organization and on a global scale required elaboration of a 
methodological basis for assessing the type and scale of the 
identified or likely threats in cyberspace, their propagation and 
consequences for the provision of key and digital services. 
Achieving a coherent and reliable global image requires a 
uniform - by all NCS entities - approach to assessing cyber 
threats. Karbowski et al. in [16] propose using Markov chain 
model, for assessing the risk of unfavourable events through 
calculation of an indicator concerning availability of 
interdependent services, which is a function of the current state 
of the system. A hierarchical approach to on-line risk 
assessment at the national level, taking into account cyber 
threats and vulnerabilities as identified at a local level of the 
services’ providers is shown in [17]. 
As a part of the NPC, proprietary risk analysis methodology 
has been developed, covering both the dynamic risk analysis 
procedure, carried out by service providers (so-called own risk), 
and the static and dynamic risk analysis procedures carried out 
by the Operations Centre System.  
It was assumed that the own risk results from the possibility 
of violating confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the 
service by using the vulnerabilities of the ICT infrastructure 
(hardware and software) used to provide it identified by the 
service provider. The results of the analysis carried out by the 
customer are reported to OCS. 
The risk analysis, performed at the Operations Centre, 
depicted in some details in [18], is based on a map of service 
interdependencies and takes into account the threats resulting, 
among others: 
• known vulnerabilities identified by the Platform's 
customers in their ICT infrastructure, 
• preparing the customer's organization for effective cyber 
security management, 
• incidents reported by customers and obtained from 
external sources. 
The impact of these threats is estimated using the adopted 
measure of criticality of the impact of services, and then the 
value of the so-called aggregate risk is calculated. 
On this basis, the aggregate risk is determined for a set of 
services (rendered by a single entity or a set of entities, within 
the sector, between the sectors or in the whole space).  
In the event of incident, whose consequence is a violation of 
the security of service provision, there is a temporary (until 
removal of the effects of the incident) increase in the value of 
aggregate risk, according to the effects caused by it, and 
determination of new risk values for other services. The effects 
of the incident are estimated on the basis of criticality of the 
service's impact on a given entity, sector or geographical area, 
which enables determination of the scale of the threat and an 
extent of its impact. 
By appropriately linking the results of analyses, carried out 
by the Operation Centre System, a global picture of the state of 
cyber security is created. Elements of the situational picture 
available to NCS entities - to the extent and degree of detail 
resulting from their role - deliver the necessary data enabling 
rapid response already at the stage of emergence of threat 
symptoms and the selection of appropriate measures to 
eliminate or limit their scope and consequences. 
IV. NPC IMPLEMENTATION 
A software layer of the NPC consists of several application 
systems that can operate independently. Edge Systems can 
exchange data without an OCS being present. In case of the 
complete or a partial network outage, all application systems are 
able to operate and store data. Data that have not been sent due 
to network outage or a remote system unavailability are stored 
locally until the problem is resolved. The NPC applications 
were deployed on a self-hosted Kubernetes platform that 
provides, among others, horizontal auto scalability and high 
level of availability. Each NPC application system is divided 
into a set of domain-specific, interconnected applications, called 
microservices, (Figure 3).  
Microservices form a business logic layer that communicates 
with database backends and serves data to the front-end 
application for the interaction with the user. The Angular front-
end application implements all views and exchanges only the 
data to the business logic layer. Application systems can be 
deployed in a highly available or stand-alone mode, according 
to end-user needs. All application systems share such 
architecture which allows for a unified approach to their 
implementation, deployment of security policy management 
mechanisms, interchangeable use of software components, both 
in edge and centre systems, as well as for secure and scalable 
communication between particular systems. The prototype of 
NPC was installed and tested in the demonstration environment 
of the Research and Academic Network Institute – National 
Research Institute (NASK) in Poland. Several operators of 
essential and digital services representing different economy 
sectors were connected via the NPC Backbone Network to the 
Operations Centre System that enabled individual users 
(institutions) to verify the basic NPC functionalities. 
The underway works are focused on installation and 
integration of the system with the CSIRT operational 








Fig.3. NPC application systems 
 
CONCLUSION 
Lessons, learned from the NPC implementation, indicate a 
need to overcome a number of procedural and technical issues 
for obtaining reliable and complete cybersecurity picture at the 
national level. The scope and degree of details of such a picture 
depends on the ability of all entities involved to providing 
essential and digital services to effectively detect and 
successfully react to cyber threats originating or being 
maliciously installed in their technical infrastructure as well as 
on their readiness to share the information on security breach 
events. Lack of sufficiently strong and widely accepted 
mechanisms, ensuring the expected level of trust of these 
entities in mutual and/or external relations, as well as 
insufficient awareness of the benefits of such collaboration can 
seriously decrease the cybersecurity level. Additionally, a 
significant number of entities still does not have highly qualified 
and experienced cybersecurity specialists and some of them also 
do not have the effective tools for configuration management 
(i.e. CMDB), which dramatically limits their ability to protect 
their utilities and information systems from cyber threats. Also, 
the rules and the procedures, related to the cooperation between 
the CSIRTs, remain an open and a very complex problem to be 
solved. The same refers to elaboration of effective procedures 
and mechanisms enabling creation of a consistent and reliable 
cybersecurity evaluation and presentation at a national level 
when based upon the data obtained from the partial images 
created by different CSIRTs. 
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